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Abstract This paper analyses the inﬂuence of bank ownership and lending on capital structure
for a sample of listed and unlisted Spanish ﬁrms in the period 2005--2012. The results suggest
that bank ownership allows banks to obtain better information and reduce the agency costs of
debt, as it has a positive relationship with the maturity of debt and a negative relationship with
the cost of debt. These results are consistent with the predominance of the monitoring effect
in bank ownership over the expropriation effect. The role of banks as shareholders and lenders
also contributes to reduce agency cost of debt, as it reduces debt cost.Debt;
Debt maturity;
Debt cost
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aIntroduction
The role of banks in the governance of non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms has
been one of the most interesting and controversial issues
analyzed in the literature of corporate governance. It is
commonplace in some countries for banks to act as a large
shareholder in the ﬁrm. La Porta et al. (1999) show that most
listed ﬁrms around the world have dominant shareholders in
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creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).ontrast to the image of dispersed ownership of the modern
orporation. Although the average percentage of ﬁrms con-
rolled by ﬁnancial institutions is around 8% for the entire
ample considered by La Porta et al. (1999), ﬁnancial insti-
utions control 35% of ﬁrms in Belgium, 30% in Sweden, 25%
n Finland and Germany, 20% in Portugal, 15% in Spain and
0% in Argentina and Norway.
Banks may potentially inﬂuence corporate governance in
everal ways (Azofra-Palenzuela et al., 2008). First, banks
ay exert the control rights of their ownership stakes par-
icipation in ﬁrm shares and may even hold a seat at the
oard of directors. Second, the dual role of banks as lenders
nd shareholders allows to reduce the conﬂicts of inter-
st (underinvestment and substitution of assets problems)
etween both groups. Prowse (1990) show evidence con-
istent with the notion that the agency problems between
an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
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and during the ﬁnancial crisis.
The remainder of the study is organized as follows:
Section ‘‘Previous literature and hypotheses’’ presents a38
hareholders and lenders are mitigated to a greater degree
n Japan, where ﬁnancial institutions take large equity posi-
ions in ﬁrms to which they lend, than in the U.S. Finally,
he presence of banks as shareholders discloses positive
nformation about the ﬁrm quality. Diamond (1984, 1991)
nd Rajan (1992) argue that bank lenders are compara-
ively superior monitors to public bondholders. Arikawa and
iyajima (2005) ﬁnd evidence indicating that bank mon-
toring by closely related banks facilitate access to debt
nancing for ﬁrms with poor growth prospects and small
rms facing strong problems of information asymmetry.
dditionally, banks may enjoy access to better informa-
ion on borrowers due to their role as shareholders. Equity
takes usually provide the opportunity to have a seat at
he board of directors, allowing better managerial control
hrough improved access to information about the actions
f executives and limiting, for example, the problem of
sset substitution. It becomes easier to assess the quality of
anagement when taking an equity stake in the ﬁrm. From
his point of view, banks owning equity signal to the market
heir assessment about ﬁrm quality, which makes it easier
or ﬁrms to attract equity and debt.
Our paper analyzes the beneﬁts and costs of bank own-
rship, studying the effect of bank ownership on corporate
apital structure. We analyze the inﬂuence of bank own-
rship not only on the amount of debt, but also on the
aturity and cost of debt for a sample of Spanish listed and
nlisted ﬁrms for the period 2005--2012. Spain is a natural
etting for examining these issues especially for two rea-
ons. First, Spain is a country with a bank-oriented ﬁnancial
ystem, where despite of the development of the ﬁnancial
arkets, banks are central in the ﬁnancing of ﬁrms. The size
f the ﬁnancial intermediaries in Spain, measured either as
he liquid liabilities or the total assets, is similar to other
uropean countries, meanwhile the weight of bank interme-
iaries compared to non-bank intermediaries is much higher
n Spain than in other European countries,1 suggesting the
mportant role of banks in the ﬁnancing of the private sec-
or. Second, Spain features relatively weak protection of
inority shareholders, high ownership concentration and a
igniﬁcant level of bank ownership. Consequently, Spain is
country where close bank-ﬁrm relationships potentially
llow banks to play an important role in corporate gov-
rnance structure. Unlike the US, where the ﬁnancial and
onitoring functions of the markets are dominant, Spanish
anks act as the main source of debt ﬁnancing and also play
major role as signiﬁcant shareholders. These characteris-
ics are common to many countries (La Porta et al., 1999)
nd hence the obtained results may be extrapolated.
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, to
he best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper that jointly
nalyzes the effect of bank ownership on the amount, matu-
ity and cost of debt. The role of banks as shareholders has
ften been at the center of the debate on the design of the
ppropriate ﬁnancial system. The current ﬁnancial crisis is
o exception. Papers that have studied the role of banks as
hareholders have not considered its effect on capital struc-
1 Azofra-Palenzuela et al. (2008) report an extensive description
f the role of banks in the Spanish ﬁnancial system.
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ure, but rather have focused on its inﬂuence on corporate
erformance.
Second, our paper analyzes the effect of bank owner-
hip on capital structure for a sample of listed and unlisted
rms. Several papers have studied the effect of owner-
hip structure on the capital structure of ﬁrms. Within an
nternational context, Lin et al. (2011) ﬁnd that the cost
f debt ﬁnancing is signiﬁcantly higher for companies with
wider divergence between the largest ultimate owner’s
ontrol rights and cash ﬂow rights. For Spain, Ochoa (1998),
uervo-Cazurra (1999), García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano
2010) and Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2011) have
nalyzed the relationship between ownership concentration
nd debt maturity and the cost of debt for samples of listed
panish ﬁrms. These papers do not always consider the spe-
ial role of bank ownership; moreover, they only focus on
isted ﬁrms.2 Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell
1995) examine the role of relationship lending in small ﬁrm
nance, taking into account the idea that the effect of rela-
ionship banking could be greater for these ﬁrms, as the
nformation asymmetries between small ﬁrms and potential
ublic investors may be large. Large ﬁrms have better access
o domestic and international markets and are therefore
sually less dependent on bank credit. However, unlisted
rms are smaller and they will depend on bank credit to a
igher extent, being especially relevant to know the role
layed by banks as creditors and shareholders. By consid-
ring listed and unlisted ﬁrms, we may obtain evidence of
hether the role played by banks as shareholders differs
etween these two types of companies.
Third, our paper distinguishes whether the bank that
olds a stake in ﬁrm ownership is also a lender of the ﬁrm
r not. By doing so, we are able to obtain evidence related
o the role of banks as shareholders depending on the exis-
ence of a lending relationship. Gao (2008) has examined the
ffects of the equity stakes and debt claims of banks on ﬁrm
erformance in Japan. Andrés et al. (2010) has analyzed the
ffect of the dual role of banks as shareholders and lenders
n the Spanish ﬁrms’ value.
Finally, bearing in mind that we consider a period of ﬁnan-
ial crisis, we also provide evidence on the inﬂuence of the
nancial crisis on the relationship between bank ownership
nd capital structure. Evidence for US ﬁrms has revealed
hat lending has decreased because of the crisis, while bor-
owing costs have increased (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010;
antos, 2011). Similarly, Crespí and Martín-Oliver (2015) pro-
ide evidence indicating that Spanish private ﬁrms suffer a
eduction in their leverage ratios due to credit restrictions
uring the global ﬁnancial crisis. We analyze whether the
ffect of bank ownership on debt amount, debt maturity and
ebt cost has differed when considering the periods before2 Zoido (1998) has analyzed the inﬂuence of bank ownership on
rm value, ﬁrm performance and debt cost for a sample of listed
nd unlisted ﬁrms for the period 1983-1995, concluding among other
esults that bank shareholders reduce the corporate cost of debt.
he database used is the Central de Balances del Banco de Espan˜a
hich contains mainly large unlisted ﬁrms.
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rBank ownership, lending relationships and capital structure:
review of the relevant literature regarding the relation-
ship between bank ownership and capital structure and
the hypotheses tested. Section ‘‘Data and methodology’’
describes the data and methodology employed, while Sec-
tion ‘‘Results’’ presents and discusses the results; and,
ﬁnally, Section ‘‘Conclusion’’ summarizes and presents the
conclusions of the study.
Previous literature and hypotheses
Large shareholders and ownership concentration constitute
a response to the lack of shareholders’ legal protection. If
legal protection does not provide sufﬁcient control rights
to small investors, then investors can probably obtain
more effective control rights by being large (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1998). Large shareholders
have incentives to collect information and monitor mana-
gement and thus address the agency problem as they have
both a general interest in value maximization and sufﬁcient
control over the assets of the ﬁrm to make their inter-
ests respected (the ‘‘monitoring effect’’). However, when
ownership is concentrated the nature of the agency prob-
lem shifts from manager-shareholder conﬂicts to conﬂicts
between the major shareholder/s and minority shareholders
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Large shareholders may repre-
sent their own interests, using their control rights to enforce
decisions that afford them private beneﬁts of control at
the expense of minority shareholders (the ‘‘expropriation
effect’’). Minority shareholders face the uncertainty of not
knowing whether the controlling owner may opportunisti-
cally deprive them of their rights.
The evidence regarding the role of large shareholders in
exercising corporate governance is conﬂicting. Among oth-
ers, Kaplan and Minton (1994) and Gorton and Schmid (2000)
have upheld the view that large shareholders play an active
role in corporate governance. However, Morck et al. (1988)
and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) present evidence that large
shareholders obtain beneﬁts from their control over ﬁrms.
Similarly, Wang (2014) show that large shareholders become
entrenched and expropriate small shareholders when there
is an excess of their control rights over their cash ﬂow rights.
The ﬁnancial literature has analyzed the beneﬁts and
costs of bank ownership, studying its inﬂuence on ﬁrm per-
formance, providing mixed results. On the one hand, some
papers have shown a negative effect, implying an expropria-
tion effect on the part of banks in those ﬁrms in which they
are shareholders (Morck et al., 2000). On the other hand,
other papers have revealed a positive effect resulting from
the monitoring of ﬁrms by banks (Cable, 1985; Gorton and
Schmid, 2000). Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca (2014)
obtain evidence for the Spanish market of such monitor-
ing activities and report that the presence of savings banks
on the board improves ﬁnancial reporting quality. Boehmer
(2000) and Tribó and Casasola (2010) ﬁnd that the effect of
the bank’s shareholdings on ﬁrm performance depends on
the bank being the largest shareholder or its ability to form
coalitions with other shareholders.Within this context we analyze whether bank ownership
affects the amount, maturity and the cost of debt. If banks
play an active role as shareholders reducing the agency costs
of debt, we will expect that bank ownership facilitates the
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ccess to debt and improves the debt conditions. Conse-
uently, the presence of banks as shareholders will have
positive relationship with the amount of debt and debt
aturity and a negative relationship with the cost of debt.
owever, the expected relationships will be the opposite if
he expropriation effect for bank shareholders is predomi-
ant.
The existence of opposing arguments for the role of bank
wnership and mixed empirical evidence means that bank
wnership may have different effects on capital structure
epending on the prevalence of monitoring or expropria-
ion effect. Having two opposing effects, our expectations
emain open and we pose two hypotheses:
1a. Banks stock ownership has a positive inﬂuence on
ebt and debt maturity and a negative effect on debt cost
f the monitoring effect is prevalent.
1b. Banks stock ownership has a negative inﬂuence on
ebt and debt maturity and a positive effect on debt cost if
he expropriation effect is prevalent.
Bank shareholders may also assume the role of lender of
rms. When the banks play the dual role of shareholders
nd lenders the previous arguments for the effect of bank
wnership on the amount of debt and on its cost and matu-
ity will result affected. On the one hand, this dual role of
anks may imply better access and conditions in ﬁnancing
or at least three reasons. First, banks may enjoy access to
etter information on borrowers due to their role as share-
olders and use this information in their lending decisions.
he presence of banks on the ﬁrm’s board allows better man-
gerial control limiting the problems of asset substitution
nd underinvestment and in general will contribute to miti-
ate the asymmetric information problems allowing ﬁrms to
aise funds more easily (Dennis et al., 2000).
Second, the simultaneous ownership of both equity and
ebt claims by banks may lead to divergent goals in the
anagement of the ﬁrm as a result of the different pay-
ff structures associated with debt and equity (Jensen and
eckling, 1976; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). Shareholders
refer to assume higher risk than lenders, whereas lenders
refer ﬁrms to maximize the probability of repayment. In
his context, banks may prioritize their role as lenders, inﬂu-
ncing management to undertake projects with less risk or
o issue equity to reduce debt. The capability of bank share-
olders to block loan concessions or renewals provides them
ith leverage to make managers align their interests with
hose of lenders.
Third, the dual role of banks as both shareholders and
enders may additionally lead to a negative information
ffect about the quality of the ﬁrm’s assets if the share-
older bank decides not to lend funds to the ﬁrm. This
ecision of not lending to the ﬁrm by the insider, i.e. the
hareholder bank, is a negative signal for other lenders and
eads to worse conditions (higher debt cost and lower matu-
ity) in loans lent by other banks or bondholders.These three arguments justify the dual role of banks as
hareholders and lenders having a positive effect on the
mount of debt and debt maturity and a negative effect
n debt cost.
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As for the negative effects of the dual role of banks as
oth shareholders and lenders on the access to ﬁnancing and
he debt conditions, the ability to obtain private beneﬁts
ncreases when the large shareholder is a bank which is also
lender to the ﬁrm. For example, diverting cash ﬂows away
rom the ﬁrms’ shareholders via the cost of ﬁnancing and
ther terms of bank loans. Similarly, Sharpe (1990) and Rajan
1992) suggest that the ﬁrm-speciﬁc information acquired by
he bank may create a hold up problem, where informational
ents may be extracted by banks ex post. The argument rests
n the idea that lenders subsidize borrowers in early periods
nd expect to obtain beneﬁts from this subsidy in the future.
he hold up problem is more serious when the bank is not
nly a lender but also a shareholder.
As we have opposing arguments for the effect of the dual
ole of banks as shareholders and lenders on the amount,
he cost and the maturity of debt, our expectations remain
pen and we pose two hypotheses:
2a. The dual role of banks as both shareholders and
enders has a positive inﬂuence on debt amount and matu-
ity and a negative effect on debt cost if the bank acts as a
onitor of the borrowers, prioritizes its role as a lender or
here is a positive information effect.
2b. The dual role of bank as both shareholders and
enders has a negative inﬂuence on debt amount and matu-
ity and a positive effect on debt cost if the bank obtains
rivate beneﬁts from the borrowers.
ata and methodology
ata
he degree to which bank ownership affects ﬁrm capital
tructure and the maturity and cost of debt is analyzed for
sample of listed and unlisted non-ﬁnancial Spanish ﬁrms
ver the period 2005--2012. The Spanish banking system is
ormed by commercial banks, credit cooperatives and sav-
ng banks. Although in the last years saving banks have gone
hrough a process of concentration and conversion into ordi-
ary commercial banks, our period of study (2005--2012)
s characterized by a signiﬁcant presence of saving banks,
nd therefore the three categories of banking institutions
ave been included in our analysis. Ownership and ﬁnancial
ata were collected from SABI (Bureau Van Dijk), which is
database containing ﬁnancial information on more of 1.4
illion Spanish and Portuguese ﬁrms. We exclude: (1) ﬁnan-
ial ﬁrms, because their ﬁnancing decision follows other
eterminants; (2) ﬁrms lacking ownership structure data;
nd (3) ﬁrms for which the data required in our analyses
ere unavailable (except for cost of debt). Finally, the num-
er of ﬁrms included in the sample was 3,044 and the sample
onsisted of 14,675 ﬁrm-year observations.
mpirical model
he objective of the paper is to analyze the inﬂuence of
ank ownership on capital structure, considering whether
he bank is also a creditor or not. To do so, we control
or the determinants of leverage, debt maturity and debt
ost that have been considered in the literature to explain
d
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hese variables. The values of these control variables have
een taken at the beginning of the period. The following
egression equations are estimated to empirically test our
ypotheses related to three alternative outcomes: amount
f debt (DEBT), maturity of debt (DEBTMAT) and cost of debt
DEBTCOST):
DEBTit = a0 + a1PROFITit−1 + a2GROWTHit−1
+a3PPEit−1 + a4SIZEit−1
+ a5NDTSit−1 + a6BOit−1 + a7D SLi
+a8BOARDit−1 +
2012∑
t=2000
Yt +
n∑
j=1
Ij + εit
(1)
DEBTMATit = b0 + b1ASSET MATit−1 + b2GROWTHit−1
+b3SIZEit−1
+ b4FIRM QUALITYit−1 + b5VOL EBITit−1
+b6DEBTit−1 + b7BOit−1
+ b8D SLi + b9BOARDit−1 +
2012∑
t=2005
Yt +
n∑
j=1
Ij + εit
(2)
DEBTCOSTit = c0 + c1PRIMEt + c2DEFAULTt
+c3DEBTFINit−1 + c4PROFITit−1
+ c5SIZEit−1 + c6PPEit−1 + c7DNEG EQUITYit−1
+c8LIQUIDITYit−1 + c9INT COVit−1
+ c10GROWTHit−1 + c11AGEit−1 + c12BOit−1
+c13D SLi + c14BOARDit−1 +
2012∑
t=2005
Yt +
n∑
j=1
Ij + εit
(3)
In addition to ﬁrm-level variables, we also include dif-
erent proxies of bank ownership (BO) in each regression
quation, as well as considering a dummy variable (D SL)
hat takes into account whether the shareholder bank is also
lender of the ﬁrm.
∑2012
t=2005Yt is a set of dummy time varia-
les for each year capturing any unobserved macro level
ffects not included in the regression. We also include SIC
ndustry dummy variables (
∑n
j=1Ij) to capture any indus-
ry effects not included in the explanatory variables. εit is
he error term. Standard errors are clustered at the ﬁrm
evel. Petersen (2009) shows that, in the presence of a ﬁrm
ffect, the standard errors clustered by ﬁrm are unbiased
nd produce correctly sized conﬁdence intervals regardless
f whether the ﬁrm effect is permanent or temporary. The
resence of the ﬁrm effect is a common characteristic when
onsidering leverage.
ariables
ppendix A describes how we deﬁne the variables used in the
mpirical analysis. Most of the variables are self-explanatory
nd have been used in other studies on capital structure. We
herefore only describe the proxies for our main variables in
etail, namely the dependent variables and bank ownership
nd lending variables.
We have considered two proxies for leverage. Follow-
ng Welch (2011), the ﬁrst dependent variable is the ratio
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debt (DEBTFIN) and maturity of debt (DEBTMAT, DEBT-
MAT FIN) and a lower total-liabilities-assets ratio (DEBT)
and cost of debt (DEBTCOST). The higher ﬁnancial-debt-to-
4Bank ownership, lending relationships and capital structure:
between the sum of long- and short-term debt and the book
value of assets and comprises a measure of the total debt of
the ﬁrm (DEBT). The second proxy for leverage (DEBTFIN),
deﬁned as the ratio of ﬁnancial long- and short-term debt
scaled by the book value of assets is a proxy for the ﬁnan-
cial debt of ﬁrms. This second proxy for leverage is included
because we are interested in ascertaining the effect of
bank ownership on the part of the debt directly linked to
the bank’s lending decisions. Following Rajan and Zingales
(1995) and Flannery and Rangan (2006), we consider the fol-
lowing variables as determinants of leverage: proﬁtability
(PROFIT), growth opportunities (GROWTH), asset tangibility
(PPE), size (SIZE), and non-debt tax shields (NDTS).
The second dependent variable is debt maturity and, as
with leverage, we consider two proxies. The ﬁrst measure
is deﬁned as the percentage of the ﬁrm’s total debt that
has a maturity of more than one year3 (DEBTMAT), while
the second proxy, DEBTMAT FIN, measures the percentage
of ﬁnancial debt that has a maturity of more than one year.
We control for the effect of ﬁrm features such as asset
maturity (ASSET MAT), growth opportunities (GROWTH), size
(SIZE), ﬁrm quality (FIRM QUALITY), volatility of earnings
(VOL EBIT), and leverage (DEBT) identiﬁed in the literature
as relevant determinants of debt maturity (Myers, 1977;
Barnea et al., 1980; Flannery, 1986; Barclay and Smith, 1995;
Stohs and Mauer, 1996; Guedes and Opler, 1996; Ozkan,
2000; Scherr and Hulburt, 2001).
Finally, our third dependent variable, the cost of debt
(DEBTCOST), is deﬁned as the interest expense for the year
divided by the average interest-bearing debt. The average
interest-bearing debt has been calculated as the mean value
of this variable at the beginning and at the end of the ﬁscal
year. Following previous studies such as Petersen and Rajan
(1994), Pittman and Fortin (2004), and Sánchez-Ballesta
and García-Meca (2011), we have considered the follow-
ing variables as determinants of debt cost: the prime rate
(PRIME), the default spread (DEFAULT), ﬁnancial leverage
(DEBTFIN), proﬁtability (PROFIT), size (SIZE), asset tangi-
bility (PPE), current ratio (LIQUIDITY), interest coverage
(INT COV), ﬁnancial distress (DNEG EQUITY), sales growth
(GROWTH), and age (AGE).
As for the set of variables of interest, we use several mea-
sures of bank ownership that are alternatively considered in
the regressions as proxies of BO: (1) OWN BANKS is the per-
centage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks; (2) OWN BANK is
the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by the largest bank
shareholder; (3) DBANK MAIN is a dummy variable that takes
the value of one if a bank is the largest shareholder of the
ﬁrm and zero otherwise; (4) DBANKS 5 is a dummy variable
that takes the value of one if the percentage of the ﬁrm’s
3 This is the amount of long-term debt identiﬁed by standard
accounting convention and traditionally used (Demirgüc¸-Kunt and
Maksimovic, 1999; Antoniou et al., 2006; Fan et al., 2012). Other
authors have used alternative deﬁnitions. Barclay and Smith (1995)
deﬁne debt maturity as long-term if it is payable after three years.
Stohs and Mauer (1996) use a weighted average of the maturity
of liabilities. The papers using alternative measures have reported
results that are not signiﬁcantly different from those obtained when
the standard deﬁnition is used. Our choice is also driven by data
availability.
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quity held by banks is higher than 5% and zero otherwise;
nd (5) DBANKS 20 is a dummy variable that takes the value
f one if the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks is
igher than 20% and zero otherwise. We consider a dummy
ariable (D SL) that takes the value of one if the shareholder
ank is also a lender of the ﬁrm and zero otherwise.4 We
lso include the ownership stake of the largest shareholder
LARGE1) to control for the ownership structure of the ﬁrm
nd a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the share-
older bank has any representative serving on the board of
irectors and 0 otherwise (BOARD) to control for the effect
f the presence of the bank in the board of directors.
One concern about the inﬂuence of bank ownership on
rm’s capital structure is the issue of endogeneity. We
ry to address this issue estimating instrumental variables
egressions.5 Following, Laeven and Levine (2009) and Lin
t al. (2011, 2013) we instrument for each bank’s ownership
roxy using the initial industry average bank’s ownership,
hich captures industry factors explaining bank equity
takes. Subsequently, we perform a Durbin--Wu--Hausman
DWH) test of overidentifying restrictions for each estima-
ion. The DWH test veriﬁes the null hypothesis that the
ntroduction of instrumental variables has no inﬂuence on
he coefﬁcients of the estimations. The results of the DWH
test are reported in the bottom row of each table. When
he p-value of the F test falls below 10 percent, the null
ypothesis is rejected and the instrumental variables esti-
ations are reported.6 Otherwise, the estimations with the
bserved values of bank’s ownership variables are provided.
escriptive statistics
anel A of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the
ependent and independent variables used in this paper.
he descriptive statistics are shown for the overall sample
nd the subsamples of ﬁrms with bank ownership and ﬁrms
n which a bank is the major shareholder. The mean values
or the overall sample of DEBT, DEBTFIN, DEBTMAT, DEBT-
AT FIN and DEBTCOST are respectively 60.02%, 31.66%,
1.98%, 57.34%, and 7.38%. Firms with bank ownership or
ith a bank as the main shareholder have more ﬁnancialThe SABI database not only provides ﬁnancial and ownership
tructure information, but also shows which banks are providing
nancial services to the ﬁrm. SABI does not provide this data on
yearly basis. We have collected this data item for the ﬁnal year
f the sample (2012). Nevertheless, we are conﬁdent that bank --
lient relationships are stable, especially in the case when the bank
s a relevant shareholder of the ﬁrm.
5 To control for potential endogeneity of bank ownership we also
se bank ownership data at the beginning of our estimation period.
his analysis reduces the concern that recent changes in ﬁrms’ cap-
tal structure might have an effect on bank ownership. The results
btained using the bank ownership data at the beginning of the
eriod do not alter the conclusions of the paper.
6 If the estimation including the OWN BANKS variable presents
ndogeneity problems the ﬁtted value of this variable is calculated
nd the ﬁtted values of DBANKS 5 and DBANKS 20 are generated. In
o case the variable DBANK MAIN is ﬁtted.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics.
Panel A. Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables for the overall sample and for subsamples according bank ownership
Overall sample Bank ownership > 0% No bank ownership Major bank shareholder No-major bank shareholder
Number of
observations
Mean (median) Number of
observations
Mean (median) Number of
observations
Mean (median) Number of
observations
Mean (median) Number of
observations
Mean (median)
DEBT (%) 14, 675 60.02 (60.97) 856 57.38 (57.75) 13, 819 60.18 (61.15) 268 55.37 (54.26) 14,407 60.10 (61.05)
DEBTFIN (%) 11, 163 31.66 (29.31) 733 33.08 (30.48) 10, 430 31.55 (29.26) 207 36.81 (34.20) 10,956 31.56 (29.25)
DEBTMAT (%) 14, 675 31.98 (24.91) 856 42.75 (42.69) 13, 819 31.31 (23.72) 268 40.66 (38.32) 14,407 31.82 (24.66)
DEBTMAT FIN (%) 11, 152 57.34 (62.21) 733 66.87 (75.72) 10, 419 56.67 (61.17) 207 63.00 (72.70) 10,945 57.24 (62.04)
DEBTCOST (%) 10, 217 7.38 (5.14) 674 6.54 (5.31) 9, 543 7.44 (5.13) 184 5.97 (4.85) 10,033 7.41 (5.15)
PROFIT (%) 14, 675 5.63 (5.01) 856 4.79 (4.17) 13, 819 5.68 (5.05) 268 4.50 (3.75) 14,407 5.65 (5.03)
GROWTH (%) 14, 675 21.46 (1.68) 856 40.10 (4.40) 13, 819 20.30 (1.52) 268 39.35 (4.44) 14,407 21.13 (1.64)
PPE (%) 14, 675 16.29 (10.32) 856 15.08 (6.34) 13, 819 16.37 (10.56) 268 14.69 (4.65) 14,407 16.32 (10.43)
SIZE 14, 675 11.02 (10.81) 856 12.45 (12.18) 13, 819 10.94 (10.75) 268 11.43 (11.21) 14,407 10.02 (10.80)
NDTS (%) 14, 675 2.49 (1.61) 856 2.26 (1.20) 13, 819 2.50 (1.64) 268 2.45 (1.09) 14,407 2.49 (1.62)
ASSET MAT 14, 298 9.64 (5.80) 843 9.62 (5.56) 13, 455 9.64 (5.81) 253 7.66 (4.14) 14,045 9.68 (5.83)
FIRM QUALITY 14, 675 0.17 (0.08) 856 0.19 (0.07) 13, 819 0.17 (0.08) 268 0.33 (0.07) 14,407 0.17 (0.08)
VOL EBIT 14, 675 2.30 (0.58) 856 2.75 (0.57) 13, 819 2.27 (0.58) 268 2.88 (0.65) 14,407 2.29 (0.58)
PRIME (%) 10, 217 5.11 (5.13) 674 5.12 (5.13) 9, 543 5.11 (5.13) 184 5.08 (5.09) 10,033 5.11 (5.13)
DEFAULT (%) 10, 217 0.77 (0.97) 674 0.76 (0.97) 9, 543 0.77 (0.97) 184 0.78 (0.97) 10,033 0.77 (0.97)
DNEG EQUITY 10, 217 0.03 (0.00) 674 0.03 (0.00) 9, 543 0.03 (0.00) 184 0.06 (0.00) 10,033 0.03 (0.00)
LIQUIDITY 10, 217 1.57 (1.20) 674 1.47 (1.15) 9, 543 1.58 (1.20) 184 1.85 (1.21) 10,033 1.57 (1.20)
INT COV 10, 217 15.22 (1.84) 674 11.69 (1.46) 9, 543 15.47 (1.86) 184 25.11 (1.18) 10,033 15.04 (1.85)
AGE 10, 217 29.14 (25.00) 674 37.93 (29.00) 9, 543 28.52 (25.00) 184 27.74 (24.50) 10,033 29.16 (25.00)
OWN BANKS (%) 14, 675 1.33 (0.00) 856 22.62 (13.06) 13, 819 0.00 (0.00) 268 36.51 (25.00) 14,407 0.66 (0.00)
OWN BANK (%) 14, 675 1.08 (0.00) 856 18.53 (9.00) 13, 819 0.00 (0.00) 268 32.41 (20.00) 14,407 0.50 (0.00)
D SL 14, 675 0.03 (0.00) 856 0.41 (0.00) 13, 819 0.00 (0.00) 268 0.50 (1.00) 14,407 0.02 (0.00)
BOARD 14, 675 0.03 (0.00) 856 0.52 (1.00) 13, 819 0.00 (0.00) 268 0.38 (0.00) 14,407 0.02 (0.00)
LARGE1 (%) 14, 675 63.48 (57.50) 856 41.30 (36.61) 13, 819 64.85 (60.08) 268 40.19 (30.00) 14,407 63.91 (58.93)
Panel B. Descriptive statistics of ownership variables for listed and unlisted ﬁrms
Listed ﬁrms Unlisted ﬁrms
Number of observations Mean (median) Number of observations Mean (median)
OWN BANKS (%) 584 6.24 (3.56) 14,091 1.12 (0.00)
OWN BANK (%) 584 3.96 (3.11) 14,091 0.96 (0.00)
D SL 584 0.24 (0.00) 14,091 0.02 (0.00)
BOARD 584 0.34 (0.00) 14,091 0.02 (0.00)
LARGE1 584 30.83 (24.95) 14,091 64.83 (60.00)
The table reports the descriptive statistics of variables for the overall sample and for the subsamples according to bank ownership. DEBT is the ratio between long- and short-term debt
and the book value of assets; DEBTFIN is the ratio between ﬁnancial long- and short-term debt and the book value of assets; DEBTMAT is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s total debt that
has a maturity of more than one year; DEBTMAT FIN is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial debt that has a maturity of more than one year; DEBTCOST is the interest expense for the
year divided by the average interest-bearing debt; PROFIT is the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses and provisions (non-cash deductions from
earnings) divided by total assets; GROWTH is the growth rate of sales; PPE is the percentage of property, plant and equipment in total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets;
NDTS is the ratio of depreciation over total assets; ASSET MAT is the ratio between property, plant and equipment and the annual depreciation; FIRM QUALITY is the ratio of net income
plus depreciation to net debt; VOL EBIT is the absolute value of change in earnings before interest and taxes; PRIME is the average prime rate for the year; DEFAULT is the difference
between the yield on 10-year corporate bonds and the yield on 10-year Spanish government bonds for the year; DNEG EQUITY is a dummy value that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm’s book
value of common equity is negative and 0 otherwise; LIQUIDITY is the ratio between current assets and current liabilities; INT COV is the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes
and the interest expense; AGE is the number of years from the creation of the ﬁrm and each year; OWN BANKS is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks; OWN BANK is the
percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by the largest shareholder bank; DBANKS 20 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks is higher
than 20% and 0 otherwise; DBANKS 5 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks is higher than 5% and 0 otherwise; DBANK MAIN is
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank is the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise; D SL is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the shareholder bank is
also a lender of the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise; BOARD is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the shareholders bank has any representative serving on the board of directors and 0
otherwise; LARGE1 is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm. All control variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th.
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iBank ownership, lending relationships and capital structure:
assets ratio and debt maturity and lower cost of debt of
ﬁrms with bank ownership consistent with the reduction in
the agency costs of debt associated with bank ownership.
The main banking stake in non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms and the
ownership concentration for our sample are also reported in
Table 1. In 5.83% of the ﬁrm-year observations, a bank holds
a percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity. Whereas La Porta et al.
(1999) show that banks take important stakes in Spanish
ﬁrms, the mean percentage of the largest bank shareholder
ownership in our sample is only 1.08%. The lower values of
bank ownership compared to those reported by La Porta
et al. (1999) are caused by the inclusion in our sample of
a signiﬁcant proportion of unlisted ﬁrms. Panel B of Table 1
reports a 3.96% average value of the main bank ownership.7
Spanish ﬁrms are also characterized by a high ownership
concentration; with a mean (median) value of the equity
stake held by the largest shareholder of 63.48 (57.50)%.
Becht and Röell (1999) report a median largest voting block
of 34.2% for 193 Spanish ﬁrms. Once again, our data differ
with respect to previous studies due to the consideration of
unlisted ﬁrms. The mean percentage of equity held by the
major shareholder is 30.83% when we only consider listed
ﬁrms, meanwhile this percentage is 64.83% for unlisted
ﬁrms.
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix. DEBT and DEBTFIN
correlate positively to proﬁtability and negatively to ﬁrms
size. DEBTMAT and DEBTMAT FIN show a positive correla-
tion with tangibility, size, growth and bank ownership, but
correlate negatively with ﬁrm proﬁtability. DEBT COST has
a positive correlation with liquidity, age, and the proxy of
ﬁnancial distress (DNEG EQUITY), but correlates negatively
with proﬁtability and DEFAULT. The correlation between the
independent variables is low, with only exception of non-
debt tax shields and tangibility which are heavily correlated
and the group of bank ownership proxies, which by nature
capture the same type of information.
Results
Bank ownership and debt
Table 3 shows the results when the dependent variable is
the total-liabilities-to-assets ratio (DEBT). The results in
columns (1) through (4) indicate a negative and signiﬁcant
relationship between the amount of debt and four of the
ﬁve measures of bank ownership. Regardless of whether the
OWN BANKS, OWN BANK, DBANK MAIN or DBANKS 5 varia-
bles are used, the coefﬁcient shows that bank ownership
reduces the amount of debt. This result highlights that the
existence of bank ownership does not increase the availabil-
ity of credit. In fact, it suggests that the presence of banks
as shareholders reduces ﬁrm leverage. The inclusion of the
dummy variable D SL, which takes the value of one if the
shareholder bank is also a lender of the ﬁrm and zero other-
wise, is carried out in columns (6) to (8). In these columns,
this dummy variable is also interacted with OWN BANKS.
7 Banks have reduced their equity stakes during the ﬁnancial crisis
period. González (2009) shows that the average percentage of bank
ownership for Spanish listed ﬁrms in the period 1991-2003 is 10.62%.
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n this case, the variable of bank ownership measures the
ffect of bank ownership on the amount of debt for ﬁrms in
hich the bank is not a lender of the ﬁrm, while D SL and its
nteraction with the measure of bank ownership respectively
easure the effect on DEBT of a bank being a shareholder
nd lender of the ﬁrm and the differential effect of bank
wnership on DEBT when the bank is a lender of the ﬁrm.
he coefﬁcient for the dummy variable D SL is negative and
igniﬁcant, indicating that the negative effect of bank own-
rship on DEBT is due to the dual role of banks as both a
hareholder and lender. In column (7) we control for the
resence of any representative of the bank shareholder on
he board of directors of the ﬁrm (BOARD). The coefﬁcient
f this variable is negative but is not statistical signiﬁcant.
he results for LARGE1 in column (8) show that ownership
oncentration is positive and signiﬁcantly related to ﬁrm
everage. This result is consistent with large shareholders
xerting managerial control.
Estimations in columns (9) and (10) show the results when
e consider the inﬂuence of whether the ﬁrms are listed
r not and the period of the ﬁnancial crisis. DLISTED is a
ummy variable that takes the value of one if the ﬁrm is
isted on the Spanish Stock Market and zero otherwise, while
CRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for
he years from 2008 to 2012 and zero otherwise. These two
ariables were interacted with the variable of bank own-
rship. The negative coefﬁcient for DLISTED reveals that
isted ﬁrms have less debt than unlisted ﬁrms, (column (9)).
here is also evidence indicating that the negative effect of
ank ownership on ﬁrm leverage turns out to be positive in
he case of listed ﬁrms. The results comparing the pre-crisis
nd crisis periods show that during the crisis ﬁrm leverage
as been reduced and bank ownership has a negative effect
n leverage. The insigniﬁcant coefﬁcient of the interaction
erm suggest that the negative effect of bank ownership on
EBT does not differ between the pre crisis and the crisis
eriod.
The impacts of the proxies of bank ownership and lend-
ng cannot be considered negligible. Using the coefﬁcient in
olumn (1) of Table 3, we observe that a one-standard devia-
ion increase in the ﬁtted value of OWN BANKS would result
n a decrease in the mean value of the dependent variable
f −1.75 per cent. The role of banks as both lenders and
hareholders is also economically important. According to
he coefﬁcients in column (6) of Table 3, being the bank a
ender and a shareholder of the ﬁrm would lead to a varia-
ion in the mean value of the dependent variable of −7.28
er cent.
As for the control variables, the relationship between
rm debt and proﬁtability is negative for all estimations.
his is the most frequently found result in the literature
n leverage determinants and is consistent with the peck-
ng order theory, given that higher proﬁtability increases
he possibility of retaining earnings and reduces, all else
eing equal, the need for debt. The coefﬁcients for growth
pportunities are also consistent with the pecking order the-
ry, as greater growth opportunities, all else being equal,
ncrease the need for debt. Size has a positive impact on
rm debt, which is consistent with size being an inverse
roxy for the likelihood of bankruptcy. This result is similar
o results reported in Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and
rench (2002), Frank and Goyal (2003), Gaud et al. (2005)
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Table 2 Correlations.
DEBT DEBTFIN DEBTMAT DEBTMAT
FIN
DEBTCOST PROFIT GROWTH PPE SIZE NDTS ASSET
MAT
FIRM
QUAL-
ITY
VOL
EBIT
PRIME DEFAULT DNEG
EQUITY
LIQUIDITY INT
COV
AGE OWN
BANKS
OWN
BANK
D SL BOARD
DEBTFIN 0.62***
DEBTMAT 0.14*** 0.58***
DEBTMAT FIN 0.04*** 0.17*** 0.70***
DEBTCOST 0.01 −0.07*** −0.03*** −0.02*
PROFIT −0.24*** −0.25*** −0.16*** −0.05*** −0.02**
GROWTH 0.02** 0.06 0.08*** 0.05*** −0.01 0.05***
PPE −0.02** 0.03*** 0.07*** 0.08*** −0.01 0.17*** −0.08***
SIZE 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.01 −0.01 −0.05*** −0.06***
NDTS 0.05*** −0.06*** −0.05*** 0.02** −0.01 0.28*** −0.07*** 0.56*** −0.09***
ASSET MAT −0.05*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.08*** −0.00 −0.07*** 0.04*** 0.27*** 0.01 −0.21***
FIRM QUALITY −0.41*** −0.32*** −0.11*** −0.01 −0.02* 0.33*** 0.06*** 0.02** −0.06*** 0.04*** 0.01
VOL EBIT 0.02** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.04*** −0.01 −0.10*** 0.24*** −0.06*** 0.02*** −0.05*** 0.01 −0.00
PRIME −0.00 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.00 −0.00 −0.04 −0.01 0.01 0.03*** −0.01 −*0.01 −0.03*** 0.02**
DEFAULT −0.03*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.07*** −0.03*** −0.11*** −0.04*** −0.01* 0.02** −0.03*** −0.05*** −0.05*** 0.01 0.53***
DNEG EQUITY 0.51*** 0.35*** 0.14*** 0.07*** 0.02** −0.29*** 0.01 −0.01 −0.02** 0.05*** −0.05*** −0.12*** 0.04*** 0.01 0.02***
LIQUIDITY −0.31*** −0.03*** 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.06*** −0.02** 0.02*** −0.11*** −0.05*** −0.13*** 0.05*** 0.36*** 0.03*** −0.00 0.02** −0.04***
INT COV −0.17*** −0.14*** −0.11*** 0.00 −0.00 0.21*** 0.02** −0.00 −0.04*** 0.01 −0.01 0.25*** −0.01* −0.02** −0.02** −0.04*** 0.10***
AGE −0.06*** −0.12*** −0.08*** −0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02*** −0.10*** 0.10*** 0.23*** 0.05*** −0.01* −0.00 −0.06*** 0.01 0.04*** −0.04*** −0.02*** −0.01
OWN BANKS 0.00 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.03*** −0.00 −0.02*** 0.03*** −0.02* 0.09*** −0.00 −0.02** 0.03*** 0.02** −0.01 −0.02* 0.01 0.05*** −0.01 0.00
OWN BANK −0.00 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** −0.00 −0.02*** 0.03*** −0.01 0.06*** −0.00 −0.02** 0.04*** 0.02** −0.01 −0.01* 0.01 0.05*** −0.01 −0.02* 0.96***
D SL −0.01 0.02* 0.06*** 0.05*** −0.01 −0.02** 0.02* 0.01 0.16*** −0.01 −0.00 0.02*** 0.02* −0.00 −0.00 −0.01 0.01 −0.00 0.02** 0.42*** 0.38***
BOARD −0.02** 0.01 0.09*** 0.08*** −0.01 0.01 0.02*** −0.00 0.24*** −0.03*** 0.02* 0.00 0.02** 0.00 −0.00 −0.02** 0.01 −0.02* 0.06*** 0.44*** 0.36*** 0.45***
LARGE1 0.09*** −0.03*** −0.05*** 0.03*** 0.03*** −0.03*** 0.01 −0.06*** 0.08*** 0.00 −0.06*** −0.02* 0.03*** −0.01 −0.01 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.02*** −0.03*** −0.04*** −0.02** −0.11*** −0.13***
The table presents the correlation matrix. DEBT is the ratio between long- and short-term debt and the book value of assets; DEBTFIN is the ratio between ﬁnancial long- and short-term
debt and the book value of assets; DEBTMAT is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s total debt that has a maturity of more than one year; DEBTMAT FIN is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
debt that has a maturity of more than one year; DEBTCOST is the interest expense for the year divided by the average interest-bearing debt; PROFIT is the ratio between earnings before
interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses and provisions (non-cash deductions from earnings) divided by total assets; GROWTH is the growth rate of sales; TANG is the percentage of
property, plant and equipment in total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total sales; FIRM QUALITY is the ratio of net income plus depreciation to net debt; VOL EBIT is the absolute
value of change in earnings before interest and taxes; PRIME is the average prime rate for the year; DEFAULT is the difference between the yield on 10-year corporate bonds and the
yield on 10-year Spanish government bonds for the year; DNEG EQUITY is a dummy value that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm’s book value of common equity is negative and 0 otherwise;
LIQUIDITY is the ratio between current assets and current liabilities; INT COV is the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes and the interest expense; AGE is the number of
years from the creation of the ﬁrm and each year; OWN BANKS is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks; OWN BANK is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by the largest
shareholder bank; DBANKS 20 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks is higher than 20% and 0 otherwise; DBANKS 5 is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks is higher than 5% and 0 otherwise; DBANK MAIN is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a
bank is the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise; D SL is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the shareholder bank is also a lender of the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise. LARGE1
is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm.
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Table 3 Debt and bank ownership.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept 0.4570*** (12.68) 0.4574*** (12.69) 0.4652*** (13.04) 0.4557*** (12.67) 0.4627*** (12.87) 0.4553*** (12.63) 0.4471*** (12.17) 0.4313*** (12.00) 0.4403*** (11.84) 0.4555*** (12.63)
PROFIT −0.8446*** (−18.30) −0.8447*** (−18.30) −0.8436*** (−18.27) −0.8439*** (−18.31) −0.8428*** (−18.24) −0.8454*** (−18.33) −0.8429*** (−18.24) −0.8374*** (−18.34) −0.8445*** (−18.24) −0.8465*** (−18.33)
GROWTH 0.0073*** (3.82) 0.0073*** (3.82) 0.0073*** (3.81) 0.0073*** (3.80) 0.0072*** (3.77) 0.0073*** (3.82) 0.0073*** (3.82) 0.0071*** (3.74) 0.0074*** (3.88) 0.0072*** (3.81)
PPE −0.0926*** (−3.16) −0.0927*** (−3.16) −0.0943*** (−3.21) −0.0910*** (−3.11) −0.0930*** (−3.17) −0.0932*** (−3.17) −0.0924*** (−3.14) −0.0830*** (−2.84) −0.0937*** (−3.19) −0.0917*** (−3.12)
SIZE 0.0196*** (6.26) 0.0195*** (6.25) 0.0187*** (6.07) 0.0196*** (6.30) 0.0188*** (6.07) 0.0197*** (6.30) 0.0205*** (6.42) 0.0183*** (5.83) 0.0213*** (6.53) 0.0195*** (6.25)
NDTS 1.7653*** (9.13) 1.7657*** (9.13) 1.7713*** (9.15) 1.7652*** (9.12) 1.7642*** (9.13) 1.7729*** (9.17) 1.7648*** (9.14) 1.7184*** (9.04) 1.7628*** (9.13) 1.7606*** (9.11)
OWN BANKS −0.0030*** (−2.71) −0.0006 (−0.91) −0.0004 (−0.50) −0.0005 (−0.74) −0.0037*** (−2.88) −0.0042*** (−3.11)
OWN BANK −0.0035*** (−2.65)
DBANK MAIN −0.0660** (−2.05)
DBANKS 5 −0.0659*** (−3.15)
DBANKS 20 −0.0285 (−1.05)
D SL −0.0728*** (−2.76) −0.0595** (−2.21) −0.0539** (−1.99)
D SL*OWN
BANKS
0.0014 (1.20) 0.0014 (1.15) 0.0010 (0.87)
BOARD −0.0429 (−1.45)
LARGE 1 0.0006*** (4.51)
DLISTED −0.0719** (−2.37)
DLISTED*OWN
BANKS
0.0051* (1.94)
DCRISIS −0.0144*** (−2.79)
DCRISIS*OWN
BANKS
0.0017 (1.42)
# observations 14,675 14,675 14,675 14,675 14,675 14,675 14,675 14,675 14,675 14,675
# ﬁrms 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004 3,004
R squared 0.0946 0.0946 0.0942 0,0953 0.0935 0.0948 0.0953 0.0993 0.0965 0.0949
F test 63.07*** 63.05*** 62.81*** 63.43*** 62.25*** 49.40*** 44.83*** 46.26*** 49.28*** 50.20***
Durbin--Wu--
Hausman
test
6.44** 6.18** -- -- -- 1.26 1.28 1.59 4.28** 6.46**
The dependent variable (DEBT) is the ratio between long- and short-term debt and the book value of assets; PROFIT is the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation
expenses and provisions (non-cash deductions from earnings) divided by total assets; GROWTH is the growth rate of sales; PPE is the percentage of property, plant and equipment in total
assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; NDTS is the ratio of depreciation over total assets; OWN BANKS is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks; OWN BANK is the
percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by the largest shareholder bank; DBANKS 20 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks is higher
than 20% and 0 otherwise; DBANKS 5 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks is higher than 5% and 0 otherwise; DBANK MAIN is
a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank is the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise; D SL is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the shareholder bank is
also a lender of the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise; BOARD is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the shareholders bank has any representative serving on the board of directors and 0
otherwise; LARGE1 is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm; D LISTED is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is listed on the Spanish Stock
Market and 0 otherwise; DCRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 and 0 otherwise. Industry and year dummy variables are
included in the estimations, although the coefﬁcients are not reported. All control variables are lagged by one year and winsorized at the 1st and 99th. T-statistics are in parentheses.
***, **, and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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nd Flannery and Rangan (2006). The negative coefﬁcients
f asset tangibility in all the estimations are not consistent
ith the greater value of these assets as collateral.8
Table 4 presents the results when the dependent variable
s DEBTFIN, which is the ratio between the sum of ﬁnancial
ong- and short-term debt and the book value of assets. The
alues of the Durbin--Wu--Hausman test do not reveal any
ndogeneity issues, therefore our set of variables of interest
i.e. OWN BANKS and OWN BANK) are based on the observed
alues of bank ownership. The coefﬁcients of PROFIT have
he same sign as in Table 3. The coefﬁcients of GROWTH and
IZE are positive as in Table 3. Tangibility of assets has a pos-
tive inﬂuence on DEBTFIN in line with the greater value of
angible assets as collateral, reducing the costs of ﬁnancial
istress and conﬂicts between shareholders and debt hold-
rs. The coefﬁcient for NDTS is negative as expected but not
tatistically signiﬁcant.
The results reveal that there is not a signiﬁcant relation-
hip between bank ownership and leverage. The results in
olumns (6) to (8) reveal that D SL has a signiﬁcant effect on
nancial leverage, reducing ﬁnancial debt. However, bank
wnership has a positive and signiﬁcant differential effect
n ﬁnancial debt when the bank is also the lender of the ﬁrm.
dditionally, distinguishing between listed and unlisted ﬁrms
oes not provide signiﬁcant results. Interestingly enough our
esults in column (10) indicate an increase of the weight of
nancial debt during the crisis period being this effect more
ntense the higher the banks stake held in the ﬁrm. This
esult suggests that during the crisis the ﬁnancial institutions
ere doing an effort to support the ﬁnancing of non-ﬁnancial
ompanies, being this effect stronger when they hold also
quity of the ﬁrm.
ank ownership and debt maturity
able 5 shows the results when the dependent variable is
EBTMAT. Following a similar approach to previous estima-
ions, we have instrumented bank ownership variables when
ecessary as indicated by the Durbin--Wu--Hausman test. The
esults are in line with a positive inﬂuence of bank owner-
hip on the maturity of debt, regardless of the proxy of bank
wnership. Bank ownership has an economically important
nﬂuence on debt maturity (DEBTMAT). A one-standard devi-
tion increase in OWN BANKS (column (1)) would increase
he mean value of the dependent variable by 4.39 per cent.
The regression model in column (6) shows that the dual
ole of banks as shareholders and lenders has no signiﬁcant
nﬂuence on debt maturity, while the relationship between
his last variable and bank ownership continues to be pos-
tive. BOARD inﬂuences positively debt maturity, revealing
hat the presence of the bank in the ﬁrm’s board of direc-
ors rises the percentage of long-term debt. The results in
olumn (8) show that ownership concentration decreases
ebt maturity. Listed ﬁrms’ debt has longer maturity than
nlisted ﬁrms’ debt (column (9)); moreover, the positive
8 This negative effect of PPE on the ratio between long- and short-
erm debt and the book value of assets seems to be due to the high
orrelation between PPE and NDTS. When NDTS is excluded from
he estimations the coefﬁcient of PPE is positive, although is not
tatistically signiﬁcant at standard levels.
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ffect of bank ownership on debt maturity is lower for listed
rms as the coefﬁcient of DLISTED*OWN BANKS is negative
nd signiﬁcant. This result is consistent with a relatively
ess relevant character of bank direct ownership in reducing
nformational asymmetry in the case of listed companies.
As for the inﬂuence of the ﬁnancial crisis on debt matu-
ity, we observe that the maturity of debt has increased
uring the crisis and that this effect does not depend on
ank ownership. Bank ownership has a positive inﬂuence on
ebt maturity both before and during the ﬁnancial crisis.
The analysis of the results for the set of control varia-
les shows that the relationship between assets and debt
aturities is positive. This is consistent with the matching
ypothesis, according to which ﬁrms match assets and liabil-
ties to reduce risk. In line with Stohs and Mauer (1996), the
ositive and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for GROWTH
s inconsistent with the agency cost hypothesis. The positive
elationship may be a consequence of the liquidity risk argu-
ent, according to which ﬁrms with long-term investment
pportunities prefer to hedge against liquidity risk by issu-
ng long-term debt (Diamond, 1991; Guedes and Opler, 1996;
ntoniou et al., 2006). The effect of ﬁrm size on debt matu-
ity is positive, indicating that large ﬁrms have longer debt
aturities. This relationship is consistent with the idea that
rms with more severe agency problems -- small ﬁrms -- may
se shorter-term debt to reduce underinvestment and risk-
hifting problems. FIRM QUALITY has a negative inﬂuence on
ebt maturity, revealing that high-quality ﬁrms tend to issue
hort-term debt as the incentives to lengthen the maturity
f debt increases with the risk of not being able to refund
ebt. Leverage is positively related to debt maturity. This
esult is consistent with Diamond (1991), who argues that,
s liquidity risk increases with leverage, highly leveraged
rms can be expected to use more long-term debt. More-
ver, this effect dominates the use of leverage and debt
aturity as substitutes in mitigating under- and overinvest-
ent problems. As regards the control variables, therefore,
he results provide strong evidence in line with the matching
nd liquidity risk hypotheses.
Table 6 presents the results when the dependent vari-
ble is DEBTMAT FIN. The results in columns (1) through
5) show an insigniﬁcant relationship between bank own-
rship and maturity of ﬁnancial debt. However, although
ur estimations in columns (6) to (8) reveal that the dummy
ariable D SL is not statistically signiﬁcant, once the effect
f the dual role of the banks as shareholders and credi-
ors is controlled, the results in columns (6) to (8) show
positive effect of bank ownership on debt maturity. This
esult suggests that bank ownership contributes to alleviat-
ng the agency costs of debt. Debt maturity increases with
wnership concentration (column (8)). This result is con-
istent with the short-term debt being no longer required
hen large shareholders exert managerial control. The pub-
ic (listed) status of a ﬁrm has apparently no effect on the
aturity of ﬁnancial debt (column (9)). The results in col-
mn (10) highlight that the role played by banks has varied
uring the ﬁnancial crisis with bank ownership experienc-
ng a differential negative effect during the ﬁnancial crisis
ith respect to the pre crisis period. Banks that hold owner-
hip stakes reduce the ﬁrms’ debt maturity comparatively to
heir inﬂuence before the crisis. As for the control variables,
e obtain evidence in line with both the matching and liq-
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Table 4 Financial debt and bank ownership.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept 0.1823*** (5.29) 0.1807*** (5.23) 0.1802*** (5.22) 0.1760*** (5.06) 0.1808*** (5.24) 0.1776*** (5.12) 0.1702*** (4.80) 0.1899*** (5.43) 0.1743*** (4.88) 0.1859*** (5.40)
PROFIT −0.6653*** (−15.55) −0.6655*** (−15.56) −0.6660*** (−15.59) −0.6681*** (−15.61) −0.6656*** (−15.55) −0.6672*** (−15.59) −0.6643*** (−15.55) −0.6731*** (−15.77) −0.6653*** (−15.53) −0.6616*** (−15.47)
GROWTH 0.0148*** (6.52) 0.0148*** (6.53) 0.0149*** (6.57) 0.0150*** (6.62) 0.0149*** (6.54) 0.0148*** (6.52) 0.0149*** (6.54) 0.0148*** (6.48) 0.0149*** (6.58) 0.0148*** (6.51)
PPE 0.1233*** (4.75) 0.1230*** (4.74) 0.1234*** (4.75) 0.1229*** (4.72) 0.1231*** (4.74) 0.1225*** (4.73) 0.1234*** (4.76) 0.1186*** (4.58) 0.1230*** (4.74) 0.1216*** (4.67)
SIZE 0.0125*** (4.12) 0.0127*** (4.16) 0.0128*** (4.20) 0.0133*** (4.30) 0.0127*** (4.16) 0.0131*** (4.24) 0.0138*** (4.36) 0.0140*** (4.54) 0.0133*** (4.18) 0.0126*** (4.15)
NDTS −0.1528 (−0.87) −0.1516 (−0.87) −0.1530 (−0.88) −0.1465 (−0.84) −0.1517 (−0.87) −0.1480 (−0.85) −0.1552 (−0.89) −0.1206 (−0.69) −0.1541 (−0.88) −0.1411 (−0.81)
OWN BANKS 0.0006 (1.32) 0.0003 (0.50) 0.0005 (0.79) 0.0002 (0.35) 0.0006 (1.14) −0.0001 (−0.11)
OWN BANK 0.0006 (1.12)
DBANK MAIN 0.0349 (1.23)
DBANKS 5 −0.0100 (−0.58)
DBANKS 20 0.0286 (1.37)
D SL −0.0452* (−1.96) −0.0357 (−1.46) −0.0560** (−2.42)
D SL*OWN
BANKS
0.0017* (1.82) 0.0017* (1.85) 0.0019** (2.07)
BOARD −0.0319 (−1.19)
LARGE 1 −0.0003*** (−2.90)
DLISTED −0.0325 (−1.29)
DLISTED*OWN
BANKS
0.0020 (1.26)
DCRISIS 0.0165*** (3.04)
DCRISIS*OWN
BANKS
0.0010* (1.83)
# observations 11,163 11,163 11,163 11,163 11,163 11,163 11,163 11,163 11,163 11,163
# ﬁrms 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598 2,598
R squared 0.0830 0.0828 0.0829 0.0826 0.0828 0.0839 0.0843 0.0861 0.0835 0.0836
F test 50.09*** 50.10*** 50.15*** 50.15*** 50.38*** 39.80*** 36.09*** 36.87*** 39.43*** 41.55***
Durbin--Wu--
Hausman
test
1.27 0.76 -- -- -- 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.92 1.33
The dependent variable (DEBTFIN) is the ratio between ﬁnancial long- and short-term debt and the book value of assets; PROFIT is the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes
plus depreciation expenses and provisions (non-cash deductions from earnings) divided by total assets; GROWTH is the growth rate of sales; PPE is the percentage of property, plant and
equipment in total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; NDTS is the ratio of depreciation over total assets; OWN BANKS is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks;
OWN BANK is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by the largest shareholder bank; DBANKS 20 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity
held by banks is higher than 20% and 0 otherwise; DBANKS 5 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks is higher than 5% and 0
otherwise; DBANK MAIN is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank is the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise; D SL is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1
if the shareholder bank is also a lender of the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise; BOARD is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the shareholders bank has any representative serving on the
board of directors and 0 otherwise; LARGE1 is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm; D LISTED is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is
listed on the Spanish Stock Market and 0 otherwise; DCRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 and 0 otherwise. Industry and year
dummy variables are included in the estimations, although the coefﬁcients are not reported. All control variables are lagged by one year and winsorized at the 1st and 99th. T-statistics
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 5 Debt maturity and bank ownership.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept −0.1489*** (−4.25) −0.1487*** (−4.24) −0.1602*** (−4.58) −0.1516*** (−4.32) −0.1544*** (−4.40) −0.1632*** (−4.69) −0.1502*** (−4.26) −0.1417*** (−4.02) −0.1420*** (−3.98) −0.1448*** (−4.11)
ASSET MAT 0.0028*** (9.73) 0.0028*** (9.73) 0.0028*** (9.82) 0.0028*** (9.74) 0.0028*** (9.74) 0.0028*** (9.73) 0.0027*** (9.63) 0.0027*** (9.44) 0.0028*** (9.72) 0.0028*** (9.76)
GROWTH 0.0106*** (4.80) 0.0106*** (4.80) 0.0105*** (4.77) 0.0106*** (4.82) 0.0106*** (4.83) 0.0101*** (4.61) 0.0100*** (4.56) 0.0100*** (4.55) 0.0105*** (4.75) 0.0106*** (4.83)
SIZE 0.0258*** (8.32) 0.0258*** (8.31) 0.0271*** (8.81) 0.0261*** (8.41) 0.0266*** (8.60) 0.0265*** (8.60) 0.0251*** (8.01) 0.0279*** (9.08) 0.0250*** (7.89) 0.0258*** (8.33)
FIRM QUALITY −0.0304*** (−4.63) −0.0304*** (−4.64) −0.0305*** (−4.60) −0.0302*** (−4.56) −0.0302*** (−4.52) −0.0306*** (−4.64) −0.0303*** (−4.61) −0.0296*** (−4.47) −0.0309*** (−4.75) −0.0301*** (−4.58)
VOL EBIT 0.0019*** (5.14) 0.0019*** (5.14) 0.0019*** (5.18) 0.0019*** (5.18) 0.0019*** (5.19) 0.0019*** (5.10) 0.0019*** (5.07) 0.0020*** (5.36) 0.0019*** (5.11) 0.0019*** (5.14)
DEBT 0.1153*** (6.73) 0.1153*** (6.73) 0.1147*** (6.70) 0.1160*** (6.77) 0.1141*** (6.65) 0.1164*** (6.83) 0.1176*** (6.92) 0.1231*** (7.21) 0.1163*** (6.80) 0.1157*** (6.75)
OWN BANKS 0.0040*** (3.51) 0.0351*** (3.57) 0.0348*** (3.54) 0.0362*** (3.67) 0.0052*** (4.00) 0.0042*** (3.02)
OWN BANK 0.0050*** (3.62)
DBANK MAIN 0.0758*** (2.68)
DBANKS 5 0.0678*** (3.05)
DBANKS 20 0.0518* (1.83)
D SL −0.2396 (−1.02) −0.3401 (−1.38) −0.3295 (−1.35)
D SL*OWN
BANKS
−0.0197 (−1.34) −0.0159 (−1.05) −0.0171 (−1.13)
BOARD 0.0691** (2.45)
LARGE 1 −0.0006*** (−5.14)
DLISTED 0.0408* (1.65)
DLISTED*OWN
BANKS
−0.0056** (−2.08)
DCRISIS 0.0218*** (3.89)
DCRISIS*OWN
BANKS
−0.0003 (−0.22)
# observations 14,298 14,298 14,298 14,298 14,298 14,298 14,298 14,298 14,298 14,298
# ﬁrms 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923 2,923
R squared 0.0876 0.0878 0.0864 0.0873 0.0858 0.0917 0.0932 0.0972 0.0888 0.0881
F test 69.05*** 69.16*** 68.07*** 69.17*** 67.94*** 56.81*** 52.02*** 54.06*** 55.80*** 57.04***
Durbin--Wu--
Hausman
test
7.21*** 8.28*** -- -- -- 13.35*** 13.44*** 14.33*** 6.32*** 7.22***
The dependent variable (DEBTMAT) is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s total debt that has a maturity of more than one year. ASSET MAT is the ratio between property, plant and equipment
and the annual depreciation; GROWTH is the growth rate of sales; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; FIRM QUALITY is the ratio of net income plus depreciation to net debt;
VOL EBIT is the absolute value of change in earnings before interest and taxes; DEBT is the ratio between long- and short-term debt and the book value of assets; OWN BANKS is the
percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks; OWN BANK is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by the largest shareholder bank; DBANKS 20 is a dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks is higher than 20% and 0 otherwise; DBANKS 5 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity
held by banks is higher than 5% and 0 otherwise; DBANK MAIN is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank is the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise; D SL is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the shareholder bank is also a lender of the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise; BOARD is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the shareholders bank has any
representative serving on the board of directors and 0 otherwise; LARGE1 is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm; D LISTED is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is listed on the Spanish Stock Market and 0 otherwise; DCRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 and 0
otherwise. Industry and year dummy variables are included in the estimations, although the coefﬁcients are not reported. All control variables are lagged by one year and winsorized at
the 1st and 99th. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 6 Financial debt maturity and bank ownership.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept −0.0223 (−0.55) −0.0224 (−0.56) −0.0234 (−0.58) −0.0137 (−0.34) −0.0221 (−0.55) −0.0269 (−0.66) −0.0166 (−0.40) −0.0380 (−0.92) −0.0275 (−0.667) −0.0221 (−0.55)
ASSET MAT 0.0017*** (5.55) 0.0017*** (5.55) 0.0017*** (5.55) 0.0017*** (5.51) 0.0017*** (5.56) 0.0017*** (5.53) 0.0016*** (5.46) 0.0017*** (5.61) 0.0017*** (5.56) 0.0017*** (5.53)
GROWTH 0.0052* (1.95) 0.0052* (1.93) 0.0053* (1.95) 0.0051* (1.90) 0.0052* (1.93) 0.0049* (1.80) 0.0047* (1.75) 0.0049* (1.83) 0.0053** (1.98) 0.0052* (1.93)
SIZE 0.0372*** (10.43) 0.0372*** (10.48) 0.0373*** (10.54) 0.0362*** (10.01) 0.0371*** (10.46) 0.0370*** (10.33) 0.0360*** (9.72) 0.0362*** (10.12) 0.0377*** (10.05) 0.0373*** (10.47)
FIRM QUALITY 0.0539*** (3.60) 0.0539*** (3.61) 0.0537*** (3.59) 0.0540*** (3.61) 0.0537*** (3.59) 0.0534*** (3.60) 0.0534*** (3.60) 0.0548*** (3.71) 0.0542*** (3.62) 0.0543*** (3.63)
VOL EBIT 0.0012*** (2.67) 0.0012*** (2.66) 0.0012*** (2.68) 0.0012*** (2.64) 0.0012*** (2.67) 0.0012*** (2.60) 0.0012*** (2.59) 0.0011** (2.53) 0.0012*** (2.69) 0.0012*** (2.69)
DEBT 0.2030*** (8.97) 0.2029*** (8.97) 0.2031*** (8.98) 0.2034*** (8.97) 0.2028*** (8.96) 0.2033*** (8.98) 0.2038*** (9.02) 0.2054*** (9.10) 0.2026*** (8.95) 0.2028*** (8.97)
OWN BANKS 0.0003 (0.38) 0.0319*** (3.12) 0.0319*** (3.12) 0.0314*** (3.05) 0.0002 (0.24) 0.0018 (2.38)
OWN BANK 0.0005 (0.50)
DBANK MAIN 0.0195 (0.52)
DBANKS 5 0.0345 (1.62)
DBANKS 20 0.0287 (0.91)
D SL 0.4169 (0.57) 0.3593 (0.50) 0.4320 (0.60)
D SL*OWN
BANKS
−0.0510 (−1.43) −0.0491 (−1.40) −0.0509 (−1.45)
BOARD 0.0435 (1.51)
LARGE 1 0.0003* (1.95)
DLISTED −0.0272 (−0.92)
DLISTED*OWN
BANKS
0.0023 (0.88)
DCRISIS 0.0215** (2.56)
DCRISIS*OWN
BANKS
−0.0020** (−2.17)
# observations 11,014 11,014 11,014 11,014 11,014 11,014 11,014 11,014 11,014 11,014
# ﬁrms 2,551 2,551 2,551 2,551 2,551 2,551 2,551 2,551 2,551 2,551
R squared 0.0766 0.0767 0.0766 0.0771 0.0767 0.0794 0.0799 0.0803 0.0773 0.0774
F test 49.45*** 49.41*** 49.57*** 49.21*** 49.29*** 41.16*** 38.50*** 38.00*** 39.94*** 40.16***
Durbin--Wu--
Hausman
test
1.44 1.42 -- -- -- 7.77*** 7.86*** 7.48*** 1.81 1.53
The dependent variable (DEBTMAT FIN) is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial debt that has a maturity of more than one year. ASSET MAT is the ratio between property, plant and
equipment and the annual depreciation; GROWTH is the growth rate of sales; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; FIRM QUALITY is the ratio of net income plus depreciation to
net debt; VOL EBIT is the absolute value of change in earnings before interest and taxes; DEBTFIN is the ratio between ﬁnancial long- and short-term debt and the book value of assets;
OWN BANKS is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks; OWN BANK is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by the largest shareholder bank; DBANKS 20 is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks is higher than 20% and 0 otherwise; DBANKS 5 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage
of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks is higher than 5% and 0 otherwise; DBANK MAIN is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank is the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm and 0
otherwise; D SL is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the shareholder bank is also a lender of the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise; BOARD is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
the shareholders bank has any representative serving on the board of directors and 0 otherwise; LARGE1 is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm; D LISTED
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is listed on the Spanish Stock Market and 0 otherwise; DCRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008,
2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 and 0 otherwise. Industry and year dummy variables are included in the estimations, although the coefﬁcients are not reported. All control variables are lagged
by one year and winsorized at the 1st and 99th. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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idity risk hypotheses as when the dependent variable was
EBTMAT.
ank ownership and debt cost
he results of the inﬂuence of bank ownership on the cost of
ebt are shown in Table 7. We observe that bank ownership
educes the cost of debt regardless of the proxy used. This
esult is consistent with bank ownership reducing the agency
osts of debt. The results in columns (6) to (8) reveal that
hen the bank is not only a shareholder but also a lender
f the ﬁrm, it results in a decrease in the cost of debt and
hat this reduction takes place regardless of the bank’s own-
rship stake. The cost of debt increases signiﬁcantly with
wnership concentration (column (8)). We do not ﬁnd differ-
nces in the inﬂuence of bank ownership between listed and
nlisted ﬁrms or before and during the ﬁnancial crisis. The
nancial crisis has reduced debt cost for ﬁrms and the exis-
ence of bank ownership has reduced the cost of debt before
nd during the ﬁnancial crisis. The reduction of the cost of
ebt during the crisis might be counter intuitive although it
s attributable to a reduction in the basic interest rates in
he Euro area designed to ﬁght the contractive effects of
he ﬁnancial crisis.
Bank ownership has an economically signiﬁcant effect on
ebt cost. Using the coefﬁcient in column (4) of Table 7, a
rm with bank ownership above 5% experiences a reduction
n the cost of debt of 2.01 per cent; i.e., 27.24 per cent
f the mean value of the dependent variable. Similarly, the
ual role of a bank as shareholder and lender reduces the
ost of debt 2.38 per cent (column (6)).
As for the control variables, the variation in the cost of
ebt due to a change in the market rate (PRIME) is statisti-
ally signiﬁcant. Increases in the default premium (DEFAULT)
o not raise the ﬁrm’s cost of debt. This result is due to
he fact that PRIME reﬂects a default premium, as the cor-
elation between these two variables shown in Table 2 is
.53. When both variables are considered alternatively as
eterminants of debt cost, their coefﬁcients are positive
nd statistically signiﬁcant (results not shown). Debt cost
ecreases with ﬁrm proﬁtability (PROFIT), revealing that
ore proﬁtable companies pay less for their debt, as ﬁrms
hat generate more cash are in a better position to service
heir debts. The coefﬁcient for interest coverage (INT COV)
s signiﬁcant and negative, as expected. This means that
rms with higher interest coverage face a lower cost of debt
s they have a lower default risk. We also obtain a positive
nd signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for the DNEG EQUITY variable.
his dummy variable identiﬁes ﬁrms for which the book
alue of common equity is negative, indicative of ﬁnancial
istress. The results show that these ﬁrms incur higher bor-
owing costs. The coefﬁcient for size (SIZE) is positive, a
esult that is not in line with the expected inverse relation-
hip between the cost of debt and ﬁrm size. However, we
btain the expected sign for the coefﬁcient of the AGE vari-
ble. Growth has a positive effect on debt cost revealing
hat riskier ﬁrms pay higher cost of debt. We obtain a strong
egative relationship between leverage and cost of debt,
ost likely revealing that the level of ﬁnancial debt reﬂects
he good reputation that companies have acquired in the
ebt markets.
b
e
t
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In summary our results indicate that having banks as large
hareholders of a ﬁrm has an overall positive effect in terms
f the conditions of debt contracting. We observe that large
ank shareholders are associated to longer terms of the debt
nd lower cost of the debt. These results are consistent with
supervisory role played by large bank shareholders. Being
large shareholder allows banks better access to the rel-
vant information to assess the borrower’s solvency. Bank
hareholders reduce the information asymmetry between
he borrower and the lender and also provides a signal of
he quality of the lender to other prospective lenders.
Not only the shareholder status of the banks is relevant
ut also its simultaneous position as lender. Our results indi-
ate that the dual role of banks as shareholders and lenders
s negatively related to ﬁrm’s leverage and debt cost. The
atter result is consistent with a monitoring and signaling
ffect of bank shareholders. The negative relation with ﬁrms
everage would be at odds with these effects, however it
ould be explained by the aversion of shareholder lender
anks to excessive risk taking when they provide both equity
nd debt ﬁnancing.
The role played by banks in facilitating debt ﬁnancing
ould result especially relevant when ﬁrms face a general
ontraction of the offer of funds as in the credit crunch
pisode starting in 2008. Bank ownership facilitates the
ccess to ﬁnancial debt during the ﬁnancial crisis although
he access to new debt comes at the cost of shorter matu-
ities consistently with banks avoiding their risk exposure in
imes of especial market turbulences.
Although, bank ownership could have a more impor-
ant effect on the conditions of debt for unlisted ﬁrms, as
he information asymmetry problems are stronger for those
rms, we do not observe a differential effect of bank own-
rship on ﬁnancial leverage, maturity of ﬁnancial leverage
nd debt cost for listed ﬁrms. These results suggest that the
ffect of bank ownership for listed ﬁrms is not different from
he one for the total sample.
onclusions
his paper analyzes the inﬂuence of bank ownership and
ank lending on corporate capital structure for a sample of
isted and unlisted Spanish ﬁrms over the period 2005-2012.
pain provides a good example of what it has been com-
only referred to as a ‘‘bank-based’’ corporate governance
ystem, characterized by a high ownership concentration,
ank monitoring, a very minor monitoring role played by
he market for corporate control and with non-ﬁnancial
rms being highly dependent on bank ﬁnancing. This set-
ing makes banks very inﬂuential due to their dual position
s major shareholders and lenders.
Our study contributes to the debate on the governance
ffects of large shareholders tackling the controversial topic
f their monitoring role or conversely their interest con-
icts with the small shareholders that leads to the existence
f the type-II agency problem. This debate is still opened
nd so far there is not a consensus about the role played
y large shareholders. Moreover, when the large sharehold-
rs considered are banks there are serious doubts about
heir beneﬁcial role for small shareholders given the spe-
iﬁc interests derived from their dual role as equity and debt
Bank
ow
nership,
lending
relationships
and
capitalstructure:
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Table 7 Debt cost and bank ownership.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept −0.0891*** (−2.85) −0.0890*** (−2.85) −0.0851*** (−2.74) −0.0885*** (−2.84) −0.0882*** (−2.82) −0.0897*** (−2.87) −0.0914*** (−2.90) −0.1023*** (−3.27) −0.0934*** (−2.96) −0.0917*** (−2.97)
PRIME 3.2422*** (6.26) 3.2418*** (6.26) 3.2505*** (6.26) 3.2434*** (6.26) 3.2439*** (6.26) 3.2460*** (6.26) 3.2508*** (6.28) 3.3191*** (6.42) 3.2506*** (6.28) 3.2479*** (6.29)
DEFAULT −0.2858 (−0.73) −0.2855 (−0.73) −0.2977 (−0.76) −0.2835 (−0.72) −0.2850 (−0.73) −0.2887 (−0.74) −0.2887 (−0.74) −0.3286 (−0.84) −0.2876 (−0.73) 0.1338 (0.33)
DEBTFIN −0.1557*** (−15.43) −0.1557*** (−15.43) −0.1554*** (−15.41) −0.1558*** (−15.41) −0.1556*** (−15.42) −0.1557*** (−15.43) −0.1557*** (−15.42) −0.1529*** (−15.36) −0.1556*** (−15.44) −0.1555*** (−15.41)
PROFIT −0.0459*** (−2.64) −0.0459*** (−2.64) −0.0441** (−2.53) −0.0456*** (−2.63) −0.0451*** (−2.59) −0.0459*** (−2.64) −0.0454*** (−2.61) −0.0423** (−2.47) −0.0457*** (−2.63) −0.0465*** (−2.67)
SIZE 0.0074*** (4.36) 0.0074*** (4.36) 0.0069*** (4.18) 0.0073*** (4.32) 0.0073*** (4.28) 0.0074*** (4.34) 0.0075*** (4.30) 0.0066*** (3.83) 0.0077*** (4.40) 0.0074*** (4.34)
PPE −0.0091 (−0.95) −0.0091 (−0.96) −0.0093 (−0.98) −0.0087 (−0.91) −0.0086 (−0.90) −0.0088 (−0.92) −0.0088 (−0.92) −0.0079 (−0.83) −0.0096 (−1.02) −0.0088 (−0.93)
DNEG EQUITY 0.0642*** (8.51) 0.0642*** (8.51) 0.0646*** (8.53) 0.0642*** (8.52) 0.0644*** (8.54) 0.0641*** (8.51) 0.0640*** (8.51) 0.0613*** (8.17) 0.0642*** (8.50) 0.0641*** (8.50)
LIQUIDITY 0.0012 (0.97) 0.0012 (0.97) 0.0012 (1.01) 0.0012 (0.98) 0.0012 (0.96) 0.0012 (0.97) 0.0012 (0.96) 0.0012 (1.02) 0.0012 (0.97) 0.0012 (0.98)
INT COV −0.0000*** (−6.45) −0.0000*** (−6.46) −0.0000*** (−6.48) −0.0000*** (−6.44) −0.0000*** (−6.45) −0.0000*** (−6.46) −0.0000*** (−6.45) −0.0000*** (−6.60) −0.0000*** (−6.44) −0.0000*** (−6.44)
GROWTH 0.0018** (2.56) 0.0018** (2.57) 0.0017** (2.48) 0.0018** (2.54) 0.0018** (2.57) 0.0018** (2.53) 0.0018** (2.53) 0.0019*** (2.74) 0.0019*** (2.69) 0.0018** (2.55)
AGE −0.0002*** (−2.81) −0.0002*** (−2.82) −0.0002*** (−2.77) −0.0002*** (−2.80) −0.0002*** (−2.82) −0.0002*** (−2.78) −0.0002*** (−2.75) −0.0002** (−2.48) −0.0002** (−2.53) −0.0002*** (−2.81)
OWN BANKS −0.0012*** (−4.85) −0.0000 (−0.13) 0.0000 (0.00) 0.0000 (0.09) −0.0011*** (−4.22) −0.0015*** (−3.21)
OWN BANK −0.0014*** (−4.86)
DBANK MAIN −0.0107** (−2.05)
DBANKS 5 −0.0201*** (−4.24)
DBANKS 20 −0.0221*** (−3.78)
D SL −0.0238*** (−4.12) −0.0221*** (−3.70) −0.0160*** (−2.68)
D SL*OWN
BANKS
0.0001 (0.22) 0.0001 (0.28) −0.0001 (−0.25)
BOARD −0.0062 (−0.66)
LARGE 1 0.0002*** (5.95)
DLISTED −0.0113 (−1.37)
DLISTED*OWN
BANKS
0.0004 (0.69)
DCRISIS −0.0062* (−1.75)
DCRISIS*OWN
BANKS
0.0005 (1.02)
# observations 10,217 10,217 10,217 10,217 10,217 10,217 10,217 10,217 10,217 10,217
# ﬁrms 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425 2,425
R squared 0.1146 0.1146 0.1131 0.1144 0.1140 0.1146 0.1147 0.1205 0.1150 0.1148
F test 28.35*** 28.37*** 28.20*** 28.38*** 28.26*** 24.63*** 23.11*** 23.45*** 24.72*** 25.46***
Durbin--Wu--
Hausman
test
15.32*** 17.11*** -- -- -- 0.26 0.26 0.44 12.06*** 16.00***
The dependent variable (DEBTCOST) is the interest expense for the year divided by the average interest-bearing debt. PRIME is the average prime rate for the year; DEFAULT is the
difference between the yield on 10-year corporate bonds and the yield on 10-year Spanish government bonds for the year; DEBTFIN is the ratio between ﬁnancial long- and short-term
debt and the book value of assets; PROFIT is the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes plus depreciation expenses and provisions (non-cash deductions from earnings) divided
by total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total sales; PPE is the percentage of property, plant and equipment in total assets; DNEG EQUITY is a dummy value that takes the value of
1 if the ﬁrm’s book value of common equity is negative and 0 otherwise; LIQUIDITY is the ratio between current assets and current liabilities; INT COV is the ratio between earnings before
interest and taxes and the interest expense; GROWTH is the growth rate of sales; AGE is the number of years from the creation of the ﬁrm and each year; OWN BANKS is the percentage
of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks; OWN BANK is the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by the largest shareholder bank; DBANKS 20 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held by banks is higher than 20% and 0 otherwise; DBANKS 5 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the percentage of the ﬁrm’s equity held
by banks is higher than 5% and 0 otherwise; DBANK MAIN is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank is the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise; D SL is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the shareholder bank is also a lender of the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise. BOARD is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the shareholders bank has any
representative serving on the board of directors and 0 otherwise; LARGE1 is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder in the ﬁrm; D LISTED is a dummy variable that takes
the value of 1 if the ﬁrm is listed on the Spanish Stock Market and 0 otherwise; DCRISIS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 and 0
otherwise. Industry and year dummy variables are included in the estimations, although the coefﬁcients are not reported. All control variables are lagged by one year and winsorized at
the 1st and 99th. T-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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olders. Debt ﬁnancing is dominated by banks in Spain and
aving banks as major shareholders is frequent for Spanish
ompanies. This situation makes it especially important to
hed some light on the governance role played by banks in
panish companies which is extensible to other continental
uropean economies due to the similarities in the ownership
tructures across Europe.
Our analysis of the role of banks as shareholders high-
ight strong effects of bank ownership on debt maturity and
he cost of debt. We obtain evidence that is in line with
he idea that bank ownership reduces the agency costs of
ebt. In fact, debt maturity increases with bank ownership,
hereas the cost of debt decreases with bank ownership.
hese results are consistent with the predominance of the
onitoring effect over the expropriation effect. However,
e do not ﬁnd that bank ownership has a positive effect on
he availability of debt. Moreover, bank ownership reduces
he ratio of the debt-to-book value of assets and has no
ffect on ﬁnancial debt.
The paper also provides evidence on the role of banks
hen they are both shareholders and lenders. The results
re consistent with the beneﬁts of the simultaneous owner-
hip of equity and debt claims by banks, as the dual role of
anks as shareholders and lenders lowers the cost of debt,
lthough it also reduces the leverage of the ﬁrm.
Our results have practical implications for politicians and
egulators. For instance in Germany where banks play a
ajor role as shareholders in other companies, there has
een a debate for years on need to limit their inﬂuence on
ndustrial ﬁrms. In other economies like the US, commer-
ial banks ownership of non-ﬁnancial companies have been
rohibited for years9 and only recently these limitations
ave been relaxed. Contrarily to these limitations the pos-
tive effects of bank ownership on the conditions of debt
nancing provides arguments in favor of the positive role
layed by commercial banks in the governance of the ﬁrms.
his results are specially relevant in the case of continental
urope where the importance of banks as major sharehold-
rs and providers of debt ﬁnancing is paramount. Moreover,
n light of the results obtained the community of investors
an see banks as active monitors that protect the interest of
hareholders rather than extracting private beneﬁts through
heir business relations with the companies in which they are
nvested.
This paper opens future lines of research. Banks are not
nly inﬂuential on the ﬁnancing aspects of the company.
anks, as debt providers, are specially interested in the risk
evels of their borrowers and therefore, they could exert
ressure to reduce the economic risk of the companies to
hich they lend money. This could be specially critical in
imes of contraction of the offer of funds, such as the
pisodes of credit crunch during the global ﬁnancial crisis.
herefore, an interesting topic for future research is the
ffect of bank ownership on the investment policies of com-
anies under the restrictive conditions of the ﬁnancial global
risis.
9 US banks can hold ownership stakes up to 5%, not directly, but
hrough Bank Holding Companies and only for portfolio investment
otives not for control reasons.C. Fernández-Méndez, V.M. González
ppendix A. Variables
he table gives the deﬁnition of variables used in the paper.
ame Deﬁnition
ependent variables
DEBT The ratio between long- and short-term
debt and the book value of assets.
DEBTFIN The ratio between ﬁnancial long- and
short-term debt and the book value of
assets.
DEBTMAT The percentage of the ﬁrm’s total debt
that has a maturity of more than one
year.
DEBTMAT FIN The percentage of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial
debt that has a maturity of more than
one year.
DEBTCOST The interest expense for the year
divided by the average interest-bearing
debt.
wnership and lending variables
OWN BANKS The percentage of ﬁrm’s equity held by
banks.
OWN BANK The percentage of ﬁrm’s equity held by
the largest shareholder bank.
DBANK MAIN A dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if a bank is the largest shareholder
in the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise.
DBANKS 5 A dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if the percentage of ﬁrm’s equity
held by banks is higher than 5% and 0
otherwise.
DBANKS 20 A dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if the percentage of ﬁrm’s equity
held by banks is higher than 20% and 0
otherwise.
D SL A dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if the shareholder bank is also a
lender of the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise.
BOARD A dummy variable that takes the value
of 1 if the shareholder bank has any
representative serving on the board of
directors and 0 otherwise.
LARGE1 The percentage of shares held by the
largest shareholder in the ﬁrm.
ontrol variables
PROFIT The ratio between earnings before
interest and taxes plus depreciation
expenses and provisions (non-cash
deductions from earnings) divided by
total assets.
GROWTH The growth rate of sales.
PPE The ratio of tangible assets (property,
plant and equipment) to total assets.
SIZE The natural logarithm of total sales.
NDTS The ratio of depreciation to total assets.
ASSET MAT The ratio between property, plant and
equipment and the annual depreciation
FIRM QUALITY The ratio of net income plus
depreciation to net debt.
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PBank ownership, lending relationships and capital structure:
VOL EBIT The absolute value of change in earnings
before interest and taxes.
PRIME The annual average prime rate.
DEFAULT The difference between the annual yield
on 10-year corporate bonds and the
annual yield on 10-year Spanish
government bonds.
DNEG EQUITY A dummy value that takes the value of 1
if the ﬁrm’s book value of common
equity is negative and 0 otherwise.
LIQUIDITY The ratio between current assets and
current liabilities.
INT COV The ratio between earnings before
interest and taxes and the interest
expense.
AGE The number of years from the creation
of the ﬁrm and each year.
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